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ABSTRACT 
This paper undertakes an exploration of the current, and likely future, significance of the 
European Union as an actor in the emerging communication policy area of Next 
Generation Networks. In so doing, it explores the key approaches taken by the EU related 
to state aid that might be given to NGNs in respect of their construction, on the one hand, 
and the content that might be delivered through them, on the other. The paper also 
explores the idea of extended forms of „regulated‟ competition that might be employed as 
NGN-related policies and the EU‟s likely position on them. Focus is here placed on the 
main aspects of the EU‟s recently articulated regulated NGN access policy, and, by 
contrast, the idea of the desirability of having to justify, and even to compete for 
available resources to deliver, public value media services in highly competitive NGN 
environments. The paper finds overall that the EU has already developed a significant 
presence in the NGN policy arena, notwithstanding the fact that it faces in the future the 
challenge of presenting itself as an actor with a coherent, coordinated remit and package 
in a diverse and complex area of communication policy 
INTRODUCTION  
 
The relatively new topic of Next Generation Networks (NGNs) is one which is ascending 
rapidly communications policy agendas in Europe and beyond. How these networks 
might be created and, beyond that, how they might function in a sustained and broadly 
useful manner, and the implications of this, are issues which crystallise a raft of often 
complex policy concerns that have emerged, for at least and decade, in historically 
distant, though increasingly connected, quarters of electronic network communications 
(mass communications broadcasting, telecommunications and, more recently, the 
Internet). At the root of these issues sit the even older, fundamental matters of the place 
of the market, on the one hand, and the public sector, on the other, in an evolving digital 
communications media landscape.  
 
Having taken a keen interest in the evolution of communications media for some time, 
NGNs is a topic to which the European Union (EU) is paying considerable and growing 
attention, not least because of their international character and potential. It is by now a 
well established fact that the EU has proven eager to get involved in new areas of 
communications policy which might allow it to gain for itself new presence, and thus 
influence, at the supranational level. Such activity has been, at times, the subject of 
considerable criticism and controversy. This notwithstanding, the EU is now largely 
accepted to be a key player in the broad arena of European communication media policy 
within which NGNs is located and is developing. 
 
Unsurprisingly, academic work on the emerging role and potential significance of the EU 
in specific area of NGN policy has barely begun. However, a considerable number of 
contributions, leaning towards either audiovisual policy or telecommunication policy 
perspectives, have addressed aspects relevant to the analysis. Here, topics include EU 
state aid in respect of the construction of NGNs infrastructure (Simpson 2009), regulated 
next generation broadband network access policy in Europe (Cave 2006; more broadly 
see Bauer 2010) and funding mechanisms such as digital „taxes‟ and levies (Digital 
Britain Report 2010) on the telecommunication policy side. In respect of audiovisual 
policy, specific studies of EU state aid to public service broadcasters (PSBs) (Donders 
and Pauwels 2008), the role of public service broadcasting in online environments 
(Trappel 2008; Van den Bulck 2008), the emergence of public service media (Bardoel 
and d‟Haenens 2008) and new funding models for public service broadcasting contexts – 
for example public value tests - (Humphreys 2010; Radoslavov and Thomass 2010) are 
noteworthy.   
 
This paper aims to take forward the analysis of the emerging role of the EU by exploring 
EU NGN policy through drawing together some of the insights of this work and, from 
this, providing a characterisation of the EU in NGN policy from a „convergent‟ 
perspective. In the process, it aims to provide an assessment of the ability of the EU to 
become a leading policy player in the relatively new arena of NGNs. The paper takes 
forward its analysis by bringing together the key approaches taken by the EU in respect 
of the issue of state aid that might be given to NGNs in respect of their construction, on 
the one hand, and the content that might be delivered through them, on the other. It 
subsequently explores the idea of extended forms of „regulated‟ competition that might 
be employed as NGN-related policies and the EU‟s likely position on them. Here, 
treatment is given briefly to the main aspects of the EU‟s recently articulated regulated 
NGN access policy, on the one hand, and, rather differently, the idea of the utility of 
having to justify, and even to compete for available resources to deliver, public value 
media services in what are likely to be highly competitive NGN environments. The final 
section of the paper draws some tentative conclusions on the current and likely future 
significance of the EU as a policy actor in NGN environments.  
 
THE EU‟S DIGITAL AGENDA AND CONVERGENCE  
The EU‟s policy on NGNs has most recently been couched in a broader policy endeavour 
articulated as the Digital Agenda for Europe (DAE), launched in May 2010. From a 
communication policy perspective, the DAE is not a new development, per se. Rather, it 
can be viewed as the latest in a series of initiatives aimed at establishing the EU as a key 
actor in efforts to utilise information and communications technologies (ICT) for 
economic growth and social welfare enhancement. This stretches back to the early-to-mid 
1990s in the shape of the landmark Bangemann Report (European Commission 1994), 
Europe and the Global Information Society, which spawned a succession of programmes 
on, variously, the Information Society, e-Europe and i-Europe. Set in the same vein as the 
new Digital Agenda, these initiatives, whilst exhibiting rhetorical strength and relatively 
high public presence, have suffered from being rather wide-ranging and diffuse in nature, 
thus militating against the achievement of policy coherence. 
 
The DAE itself has seven broad goals, one of which is to provide EU citizenry with fast, 
and ultimately very high speed, Internet access. By 2020, the goal has been set to provide 
all users with download speeds of at least 30 Mbps, with half of these actually being able 
to download data from the Internet at the rate of 100Mbps (European Commission 
2010a). The achievement of this goal might be regarded as germane to the delivery of 
several of the others in the agenda with a specific commercial and social bent, notably 
creation of a so-called Digital Single Market; enhancing digital literacy, skills and 
inclusion; and applying ICT to address social challenges such as climate change, rising 
healthcare costs and an ageing population (European Commission 2010b). More broadly 
still, and in the context of the global financial crisis of 2008 and subsequent economic 
recession affecting Europe, the EU set out, in March 2010, its Europe 2020 economic 
growth package. One of the seven areas of priority outlined in the strategy is the DAE 
(European Commission 2010c; see also European Council 2009).  
 
The creation of NGNs lies at the heart of the EU‟s goal of faster Internet access. In 
support of the latter, the European Commission, in September 2010, announced three 
complementary measures, aimed, respectively, at encouraging new investment by the 
public and private sectors in high speed broadband networks; creating a regulatory 
system for competitive access to NGNs; and a policy programme for the use of radio 
spectrum with a view to encouraging further growth in wireless broadband infrastructures 
and services (European Commission 2010d).  In its communication on broadband 
investment, the European Commission gave what might be viewed as an important signal 
on its future approach to dealing with the role of the public sector in NGN delivery. Here, 
it argued that „because of the critical role of the internet, the benefits for society as a 
whole appear to be much greater than the private incentives to invest in faster networks‟ 
(emphasis added) (European Commission 2010e: 3). The Commission cited an estimate 
of the daunting cost of achieving its 2020 goals: the creation of ubiquitous 30 Mbs 
Internet usage speed would cost Euro 38-58 billion and to deliver 50% household 
coverage at 100Mbps would cost Euro 181-268 billion. As a consequence, it appeared to 
prescribe a dual approach, urging Member states to utilise the effective implementation 
of the EU‟s market-based Electronic Communications Regulatory Framework, on the one 
hand, and, on the other, its stipulations regarding state aid to broadband (see below).  
 
In asking Member States to operationalise their broadband strategies, the Commission 
indicated that it would establish a system of cross-national peer review, and 
establishment and transfer of best practice, thus providing a clear indicator of the rising 
importance of „soft‟ governance policy measures in the EU‟s interventions in 
communications media regulation. Recent work in telecommunication has found 
evidence that the EU has sought to employ soft governance measures to deal with policy 
matters whose detail proves either complex and/or controversial (see Simpson 2010) and 
there is also some evidence of this occurring in particularly thorny aspects of its 
audiovisual policy, notably media pluralism (Humphreys 2008). The issue of devising 
and executing an effective policy for NGN certainly fits in to this category.  
 
It is useful to think of NGN as a key example of the policy challenges arising from the 
convergence of communications. Viewed broadly, NGNs present environments in which 
the long heralded convergence between IT, broadcasting, the Internet and 
telecommunication might actually be manifest. However, the still very much aspirational 
nature of the development was neatly (if perhaps inadvertently) summed up by the 
Commission recently when it argued that a key problem with current market led 
investment in NGNs is that „outside areas where they face infrastructure competition, 
operators have been reluctant to move beyond their established…business. Most 
operators do not see a convincing business case for a large scale network upgrade…also 
considering that there are not, as yet, enough attractive services available that would 
make customers pay a premium price‟ (European Commission 2010e: 5). 
 In dealing with the kind of communications convergence policy challenges which a 
holistic - that is a network creation and effective service provision and content – approach 
to NGN requires, the EU has had mixed success at best to date. A somewhat notorious 
policy foray into the territory of creating an EU regulatory framework to cater for 
convergence through a Green Paper and subsequent consultation of the late 1990s 
(European Commission 1997), exposed the fact that whilst Member States at that stage 
were willing to countenance the creation of an EU level regulatory framework to cater for 
electronic communications networks (and associated services), there was considerable 
antipathy towards any move in this direction in respect of content, most clearly related to 
broadcasting (see Levy 1999; Michalis 1998). The limited ensuing policy compromise in 
the shape of what become known as the Electronic Communications Regulatory 
Framework was convergent only to the extent that it covered communications 
infrastructures. The episode merely served to point up, at the time, the weak position of 
the EU found itself in when attempting to exercise control over the evolution of  
electronic content services (or put more traditionally, broadcasting) in its Member States 
(Simpson 2000).  However, almost a decade and a half later, and with the movement 
towards digital convergence having proceeded apace across the EU, to what extent is the 
EU now better placed to be able to develop as an effective policy actor in the essentially 
convergent communications landscape of NGN in which it is predicted a plethora of 
audiovisual services, old and new will increasingly be provided? 
 
EU APPROACHES TO STATE AID IN NGN ENVIRONMENTS  
Analysis of the EU‟s approach to state aid provides some answer to this question. The 
legitimacy or otherwise of state aid is determined through a well established legal 
framework ensconced in the EC Treaty, thus giving the EU considerable legitimacy and 
scope for action. Central to this are articles 87 and 88 dealing directly with state aid and 
article 86(2) on the application of the Treaty to services of general economic interest 
(SGEI), covering public service provision.  Article 16 of the Treaty of Amsterdam 
introduced a specific provision on SGEI and, in 2005, the European Commission created 
an SGEI framework. The Commission has argued that state aid can ameliorate market 
failures, though it has also recently gone further than this by contending that, even in 
cases where market efficiency is evident, societal gain might not be maximised, thus 
leaving grounds for state intervention to ensure that market effects generate enhanced 
social outcomes (European Commission 2009a).   
 
Very clearly, however, even this approach is underscored by strong normative 
assumptions of the superiority of the market. As might be expected, therefore, the 
conditions under which state aid is deemed permissible are limited. Under article 87, a 
number of cumulative conditions need to pertain for state aid to be deemed to exist. The 
measure must be funded by the state and confer and provide economic benefits to those 
parties receiving it. It must in its effects or potential be competition distorting, in the 
process affecting intra EU trade (European Commission 2009a: 3). Article 86 of the EC 
Treaty deals with the application of state aid rules as public services (European 
Commission 2001) alongside the findings of the 2003 Altmark ruling, which focused 
specifically on services of general economic interest (SGEI). In order for a measure to lie 
outside the scope of article 87 (and thus remain beyond a Commission investigation), 
four Altmark criteria must be met. First, the state must have undertaken a formal 
entrustment of a service in question to the recipient of its resources alongside clear 
statement of its obligations. Second, there must be a transparent and objective system in 
place to establish the appropriate figure to compensate the service provider with for 
delivering the SGEI before any resources are transferred. Third, the compensation must 
not be excessive. Fourth, if the system does not operate along clear, competitive public 
procurement lines, the determination of appropriate compensation must occur by 
calculating the typical costs of providing the service allowing for a reasonable level of 
profit (European  Commission 2009a: 5-6).  
 
In any assessment of the compatibility of a state aid measure with article 87(3), the 
Commission undertakes a so-called „balancing test‟ to compare the benefits of the 
measure against any competition distorting costs. In the important matter of national 
culture, Member states are permitted to view aid aimed at cultural promotion as 
appropriate as long as it does not affect trade and competition to an degree that might be 
considered counter to the common (European Union) interest, though the Commission 
has made the point that public service broadcasting (PSB) revenue tends not to 
differentiate between the cultural, educational and democratic goals which it might aim to 
further (European Commission 2009b). Overall, the EU‟s approach is underpinned by 
two key ideas – maintaining the primacy of market based competition, where state aid is 
viewed as distortive, though necessary, and ensuring appropriate returns (value) for any 
state resources which are invested. In the context of NGN environments, this legal 
framework is supplemented by two key specific European Commission Communications 
on state aid to public service broadcasting (European Commission 2001 and 2009b) and 
another on broadband (European Commission 2009a) . 
 
 
Infrastructural Issues – the EU’s Approach to Public Sector Involvement in the Creation 
of NGN 
The EU, through the European Commission, has recently provided an indication of how 
important a policy actor in NGN it can become by turning its attention to developing a 
policy position on the possible role which state aid might play in the crucial task of 
constructing NGN infrastructures. As noted above, pursuing the development of EU 
policy authority over the functioning of electronic communications infrastructures is an 
area in which the EU can be regarded as having been particularly successful. The 
Electronic Communications Regulatory Framework (ECRF), which came into force in 
2003, covers all network infrastructures, including those used for the transmission of 
broadcast and Internet services (which are themselves are excluded), though the ECRF 
regulatory agenda has tended to be dominated by telecommunication policy matters. This 
has involved a weighty and elaborate policy agenda around creating and adjusting a 
system of market based regulation framed at EU level and implemented nationally. Thus, 
unsurprisingly, the evolution of the ECRF and the creation of NGN environments has 
recently become a subject of some importance for the EU (see below).  
 
A much less high profile area has been the EU‟s policy toward state aid in respect of the 
construction of broadband telecommunication networks and, lately, NGNs, specifically 
what are referred to as Next Generation Access (NGA) networks (put simply, that part of 
the network closest to the end-user). This can be explained simply by the overwhelmingly 
liberal market agenda of EU telecommunication policy, where state intervention has been 
de-emphasised and even viewed with antipathy. Nonetheless, the EU has developed a set 
of rules for the consideration of state aid to broadband network construction and made 
(mostly favourable) judgements in a relatively modest number of cases
1
.  
 
Due to its liberal market framing, the circumstances in which state intervention in the 
construction of broadband networks can be sanctioned by the EU, like state aid in 
general, are very limited. Thus, paradoxically, the EU has strongly developed legal 
powers here bit with limited scope for policy action (Simpson 2009). The EU has 
designated three kinds of system or „area‟, denoted „white‟, „grey‟ and „black‟ 
respectively. Each area reflects the degree of network competition pertaining in any 
particular case and is the basis from which judgements are made by the European 
Commission on whether state aid is permissible. White areas are defined as those in 
which no network infrastructure of the kind proposed through state aid exists, with no 
prospect of any being developed through other means in the near future. Grey areas have 
one broadband network in operation, thereby creating an undesirable monopoly situation 
which might be rectified through (partial) state assistance, where there is evidence that 
customer demand is not being met and where the state aid in question could be proven to 
be the least distorting of a range of measures that might be employed, not least market 
regulation. Thirdly, black areas are those in which there are two or more already 
functioning broadband networks in which service providers compete directly with each 
other. These areas will most likely not be considered appropriate for the receipt of state 
aid to create broadband networks (PLC 2009).  
 
The recent examination by the EU of the potential scope for state intervention to assist 
the realisation of very high speed broadband, or NGN, suggested that this conservative 
perspective might be loosened and broadened to some extent. The growing realisation of 
the future importance of NGN development to economic growth lay behind the EU‟s 
thinking, given more urgency by the realisation of the likely medium to long term effects 
of the international financial crisis on the EU‟s economy. The European Commission, in 
late 2008, urged investment in broadband infrastructures as part of an outline strategy for 
economic growth (European Commission 2008).  In 2009, it produced consultative 
proposals (European Commission 2009a), followed by a finalised set of guidelines on 
state aid to broadband, a significant element of which addressed the issue of NGNs 
(European Commission 2009a). 
 
In its analysis, the Commission made the important point that some key public work 
necessary for the creation of Next Generation Access networks, namely civil 
construction, can be undertaken without it being considered state aid as long as the work 
in question was not sector specific in nature. In other words, the infrastructural facility 
created by the work would have to be made available for use to entities beyond the 
communications sector. Beyond this, in its consideration of possible state aid for the 
construction of NGA networks, the Commission adopted a modified version of its 
„traditional‟ broadband classification system. Here, in so-called „white‟ areas, no NGA 
networks would be in existence with no likelihood of them being created through the 
market in the near future. The Commission in its final agreed rules shortened the 
definition of the near future from 5 to 3 years which pointed towards a loosening of the 
criteria that might permit state aid to be sanctioned (PLC 2009). In these areas, no basic 
broadband infrastructure may exist or there may be one or more provider of basic level 
broadband services. The Commission made it clear that it will consider the effects of any 
proposed state aid on existing broadband networks, as well as undertaking a balancing 
test. Where one basic broadband service provider exists, states must be able to show that 
the level of service does not meet private and business consumer needs and that the 
policy goal in question cannot be achieved through non state aid means. 
 
For so-called NGA network „grey‟ areas, any state aid towards building a new network 
would have to demonstrate its necessity in terms of the existing NGA infrastructure being 
insufficient to satisfy demand, which suggests a (possibly contradictory) tolerance of 
regulated network monopoly (Simpson 2009). Regarding NGA network „black‟ areas, the 
agreed Commission guidelines declare state aid for the provision of a new network 
unacceptable in terms of competition distortion. However, the guidelines also indicate 
possible scope for state assistance regarding the transition from „traditional‟ broadband 
network „black‟ areas to NGA network „black‟ areas where the timeline is judged too 
lengthy and thus unresponsive to user demands. Those receiving assistance in these 
circumstances would have to make available wholesale access to their network for seven 
years and the network would have to allow complete unbundling. 
 
Content Issues – Evidence from the EU’s approach to State Aid to PSB and its Extension 
into PSM Environments 
The domain of state aid to public service broadcasting is one in which the EU‟s policy 
powers, derived from its legally established remit, are as in the case of communications 
infrastructure, relatively strong and have a direct influence on content in NGN 
environments as they develop. Perhaps more significantly than in the case of  
infrastructure, they commence from the starting point assumption of the EU acting as a 
set of institutions with market integrating, shaping and policing goals. This has been very 
clearly illustrated in the EU‟s consideration of the movement by public service 
broadcasters towards developing new digital content and services, part of which would be 
delivered online. The matter addressed directly, and controversially, the extent to which 
current online – and by extension future NGN – environments are, in the EU‟s 
perspective, a legitimate space within which public service media activities can be 
sanctioned at the national level. 
 
Historically, as is well established, Member States have maintained tight control over the 
development of public service broadcasting in their territories, resisting strongly, for the 
most part, any efforts made to transfer regulatory sovereignty to the EU level. The 
Commission, in an important recent update of its 2001 Communication on state aid to 
public service broadcasting, in part aimed at dealing with new public service media 
environments of the kind expected to be delivered through NGNs, has stated its support 
for broadcasters with a public service remit taking advantage of : 
 
 „the opportunities for [delivery of] services offered by digitalisation and the diversification of 
distribution platforms on a technology neutral basis, to the benefit of society…public service broadcasters 
may use state aid to provide audiovisual services over new distribution platforms, catering for the general 
public as well as for special interests, provided that they are addressing the same democratic, social and 
cultural needs of  the society in question, and do not entail disproportionate effects on the market, which 
are not necessary for the fulfilment of the public service remit‟ (European Commission 2009a: 11).  
 
Nevertheless, despite the policy rhetoric, previous evidence suggests that the EU, based 
on the legal-economic tools at its disposal through the state aid framework, has been 
considerably more conservative in its consideration of developments in new media and 
the possible role of public service broadcasters across the EU in delivering public service 
media (PSM). Conscious of  strongly guarded national Member State role in determining 
public service broadcasting, the Commission underlined the fact that its role here is 
„limited to checking for manifest error‟ (ibid: 10). However, providing an important 
signal of its possible future policy leverage in NGN environments and the intention to use 
this, the Commission also argued that the „definition of the public service remit 
would…be in manifest error if it included activities that could not reasonably be 
considered to meet – in the wording of the Amsterdam Protocol -  the “democratic, social 
and cultural needs of each society”‟ (ibid: 8). The Commission went on to mention 
specifically advertising, e-commerce, teleshopping, premium rate numbers in game 
shows and sponsorship or merchandising, though clearly this also leaves scope for other 
matters to be included, that might not pass muster in terms of „public value‟.  
. 
In their analysis of the application of EU state aid rules to PSB and, specifically, possible 
extensions of it into the public service media environment, Donders and Pauwels (2008) 
argue that in respect of the key criterion of definition, the European Commission has, in 
practice, merely expressed doubts, but not directly challenged, instances of public 
funding of broadcasters. In its 2009 guidelines, the Commission has stated that „the 
definition of the public service remit may also reflect the development and diversification 
of activities in the digital age and include audiovisual services on all platforms‟ 
(European Commission 2009b: 7).  
 
When considering the important criterion of proportionality, by contrast, negative 
decisions have been taken by the EU in respect of the new media activities of the Dutch 
broadcaster, NOS, and the Danish broadcaster, TV2. However, the extent to which the 
Commission is able to undertake accurate calculations in its decisions here has been 
called into question. Beyond this, perhaps the most important issue for the delivery of 
public service media in NGN environments concerns the requirement in EU state aid 
rules for a modification of definition and entrustment arrangements in respect of the 
public service provider, to take place. In its protracted and controversial examination of 
the digital media expansion of German broadcasters ZDF and ARD, the Commission 
argued against bestowing a general authorisation to PSBs to deliver the kinds of new 
services that will characterise NGN environments (Donders and Pauwels 2008: 302-4). 
This case also generated a very significant outcome in respect of the creation of so-called 
public value tests at the national level (see below). 
 
The Commission has also made some interesting comments on the possibility of PSBs 
charging personal subscriptions to customers for individual services, a situation likely to 
be highly characteristic of future NGN service contexts.  Here „a direct renumeration 
element in such services – while having an impact on viewers -  does not necessarily 
mean that these services are not manifestly part of the public service remit provided that 
the pay element does not compromise the distinctive character of the public service in 
terms of serving the social, democratic and cultural needs of citizens, which distinguishes 
public services from purely commercial activities‟ (European Commission 2009b: 12). It 
went on to argue, perhaps somewhat contradictorily, its familiar refrain that PSBs could 
be entrusted with these services by states as long as there were not disproportionate 
effects on competition and intra-EU trade. The Commission claimed that it was up to 
Member States when considering any new audiovisual service in this manner to 
undertake a consultation and evaluation of whether or not the service met the 
specifications of the Amsterdam Protocol. This is clearly an area in which the EU is 
likely to try to exert its policy presence in the future. 
 
REGULATED COMPETITION IN NGN ENVIRONMENTS: NETWORK AND 
SERVICE DELIVERY POTENTIAL  
 
Regulated Competition and Next Generation Access Network Creation 
The use of state aid as an EU policy lever to deliver NGN environments is overshadowed 
- and to a significant degree circumscribed - by the regulatory package that has been 
constructed at the EU level to deliver competition in electronic network communications. 
As noted above, the origins of the EU‟s Electronic Communications Regulatory 
Framework (ECRF) lie in a body of policy work developed since at least the mid-1980s 
whose aim has been to liberalise and harmonise the telecommunications markets of EU 
Member States (Michalis 2007). The ECRF is a broad and detailed framework whose 
legislative parameters are operationalised at the national level by a series of National 
Regulatory Authorities (NRAs). The EU, through the European Commission, has also the 
responsibility to ensure that the ECRF is implemented effectively at the national level 
(see Goodman 2006). Overall, therefore, in respect of the infrastructures and associated 
services that will make up the NGN environment, the EU can be seen to have developed 
considerable policy leverage through playing a key role in setting out and monitoring the 
regulated competition that characterises overwhelmingly an important part of any future 
system. In this context, what is in the public interest is viewed firmly through an end-
user-consumerist, market, lens which eschews state intervention of the kind envisioned, 
albeit in a very limited way, in the EU‟s state aid policy for broadband infrastructure.  
 
Around the same time as the EU began to develop its thinking on state aid to NGN, it 
also addressed the issue of regulated market competition as a route to their creation, with 
specific focus in this case on NGA networks. Unsurprisingly, it soon become clear that 
regulated competition was to be the main strategic route to the realisation of NGN 
infrastructural environments from the Commission‟s perspective. In 2008, it produced a 
draft Recommendation which approached NGA networks from two closely related 
angles. First, there was a strongly perceived need to incentivise those market players with 
enough investment capacity – essentially former telecommunications incumbents – to 
create them. Second, in tandem with this, the Commission sought to stimulate an 
environment in which access to these core infrastructures could be afforded to the 
competitors of the incumbents which would have invested in upgrading their networks to 
NGA network specifications.  
 
The problem faced by the EU and Member states alike centres on undertaking 
successfully a fine balancing act to realise each of these objectives.  The answer, 
according to the Commission, should entail providing a strong regulatory system with 
features such as lowest level access (in this case to the incumbent‟s network ducts) to 
afford competitors the facility of installing their own fibre; access to unused fibre of the 
incumbent, as well as to its „live‟ bitstream capacity (European Commission 2008).  
Overall, this essentially amounted to a system of asymmetric regulation aimed at 
mitigating the potentially excessive power of incumbents in NGA network environments. 
As such, the Commission‟s proposals were strongly criticised by the European 
Telecommunications Network Operators, the peak level representative body for the 
former incumbents (EurActiv.com, 12.6.09).  Despite this, in September 2010, as part of 
its strategy for the realisation of the Digital Agenda for Europe, the Commission 
published final Recommendations for regulated access to NGA networks. Reflecting the 
fact that little, if anything, had changed in its thinking, the Commission noted at the 
outset that it wished to promote „efficient investment in new and enhanced infrastructure, 
taking due account of the risks incurred by all investing undertakings and the need to 
maintain effective competition‟ (European Commission 2010f: 35).  
 
Focusing its attention on two particular markets – respectively for wholesale network 
infrastructure access and wholesale broadband access – the Commission argued that 
NRAs should inter alia: provide, through mandated regulatory measures, access to 
existing civil engineering infrastructure at prices reflective of costs; ensure where legally 
permissible that the incumbent operators when building civil engineering infrastructure 
create space to allow alternative operators to use the facilities in question; mandate access 
to the terminating element of the incumbent‟s access network at cost oriented prices; 
encourage or, if legally possible, mandate incumbent operators to employ multiple fibre 
lines in the terminating part of the NGA; mandate, in principle, unbundled cost oriented 
access to the fibre loop of incumbent operators plus co-location and back-haul measures 
(European Commission 2010f: 41-42). With respect to wholesale broadband access, the 
Commission recommended that incumbent operators be obliged to make new wholesale 
broadband access products available to competitors at least six months in advance of the 
incumbent offering its own services, unless other clear ways were available to ensure 
non-discrimination. These products should be regulated to mandate cost orientation in 
their pricing (European Commission 2010f: 42-43). 
 
Given the economics of NGA network and NGN creation, there is little scope for creating 
much more than duopolistic network competition and significant arguments exist against 
doing so in the current economic climate. The policy alternatives for NGA are, thus, 
relatively few. Heavily engineered regulatory competition involves a political struggle 
between what the regulator wishes to impose and what the incumbent regulatee is capable 
of resisting. Regulatory network duopoly or oligopoly is far from the realisation of the 
neo-liberal market dream that has underpinned much telecommunication policy thinking 
in the EU since the late 1980s. The alternative of state public (re) ownership of network 
infrastructures to allow regulated competition to then take place across them seems 
highly unlikely to be proposed by the EU, nor to be accepted by Member States. 
 
Delivering Public Media Services Through Regulated Competition 
The issue of the provision of content in future NGN contexts raises a series of interesting 
and controversial issues around the role that public service media will play in the future. 
There is little doubt that the overwhelming majority of content services provided across 
NGNs will be delivered in a system of regulated competition. The previous section has 
illustrated that the EU has become involved in a consideration of some of the state funded 
activities of public service broadcasters in new areas of content creation and service 
delivery which point towards the kind of future NGN service environment which is likely 
to evolve. In so doing, the EU has provided evidence that it is likely to be a significant 
policy actor. Further to this, as noted above, the EU‟s recent Communication on state aid 
to public broadcasting has delivered a general message of rhetorical support for the 
public funding of new service in online scenarios. However, tempering this, a key 
message, consistently promoted by the EU is that any such activity fundamentally must 
not distort competition in the single market. Though very early days, to what extent, then, 
is the EU likely to develop policy positions on (re) articulations of public media service 
provision according to the parameters of regulated market competition? 
 
A key issue for the EU, in its treatment of public resources allocated to broadcasting and 
extensions of it into the online environment, has been the need to provide a justification 
for the level of resourcing in question. More broadly, recent debates on public service 
broadcasting have focused on creating a methodology for the public utility of any 
extension of the PSB remit to be examined. So-called public value tests (PVT) in the UK 
and three step tests, “Drei-Stufen-Test” (DST), in Germany, are prominent examples of 
developments to address this challenge. The creation of the DST Germany is a direct 
consequence of the EU Commission‟s controversial intervention in respect of complaints 
made to it, under the state aid framework described above, by German commercial 
broadcasters regarding the extension of activities of the publicly funded broadcasters 
ARD and ZDF. This resulted in an accommodation agreement between the EU and the 
German government, part of which is the DST.  Here, the public licence fee payments 
were deemed compliant with EU competition law on the condition that a system was 
evidently in place in Germany to define and justify the remit of the PSB, of most concern 
being the possible move of PSBs into the provision of Internet based services. The DST, 
in the revised 2009 Inter-State Treaty on Broadcasting, became an important part of this. 
The new law stated that all PSB online services, existing and new, had to undergo a test 
to determine the extent to which the service is necessary to address societal, cultural, 
democratic and social needs, as well as the degree to which it contributes diversity in 
editorial content. The DST also considers the extent to which the public resources 
allocated to the service are necessary for its delivery. According to Radoslavov and 
Thomass (2010: 6-7), an assessment of „contribution to the journalistic and editorial 
competition (publizistischer wettbewerb), which is specifically not a quantitative but a 
qualitative dimension, is the decisive element of the three step test‟.  
 
In the UK, the development of the PVT was initiated by the UK PSB, the BBC,  itself 
and became part of its charter at the latest renewal point in 2006. Whilst possibly not a 
direct result of the EU‟s decision in respect of the complaints by German commercial 
broadcasters, it is likely that past and potential future investigation by the EU into 
activities of PSBs played some role. The UK case provides an important illustration of 
the policy dilemma in respect of the continued public funding of media services within an 
expanding and increasingly market-oriented communications environment, epitomised by 
the evolution to NGN environments. On the one hand, the PVT contains a public value 
assessment (PVA) conducted by the BBC‟s self-regulatory Trust. By contrast, the PVT 
also contains a market impact assessment (MIA) which is conducted independently by 
the UK‟s convergence communications regulator, the Office of Communications 
(Ofcom), whose remit lies very much in the domain of market regulation and monitoring.  
 
At the end of a process set out to take, at most, six months in each case under 
consideration, it is the BBC‟s Trust which takes a final decision on whether to permit any 
extension in the BBC‟s public service activities. Here, the decision should hinge on it 
being satisfied that „any likely adverse impact on the market is justified by the likely 
public value of the change‟ (BBC Trust 2007: 4). Overall, the PVT must consider impact 
on users; the financial implications of the change; the degree of novelty it would entail 
and, finally, its duration. In the PVA aspect of the test, a determination of the likely 
individual value to licence payers, as well as the overall societal value of the change is 
undertaken. Interestingly, this element of the PVT also contains an assessment of the 
value for money of any proposed change focusing on what it would cost. The PVA 
contains four key criteria, called „drivers of public value‟: reach, quality, impact and cost 
and value for money. The degree of difficulty in providing a systematic analysis of public 
value is betrayed by the Trust‟s assertion that „the exact definition of each of these 
drivers of public value will be determined in the PVA and may vary depending on the 
nature of the relevant proposals‟ (BBC Trust 2007: 14).  
 
The MIA aims to provide an assessment of the current and likely future effect of any 
extension of the BBC‟s activities on other services offered in the market in question. It is 
important to note that while Ofcom undertakes the MIA, the process and outcome is 
overseen by a Joint Steering Group of Ofcom and BBC Trust members in equal numbers. 
An early example of an MIA carried out by Ofcom concerned a BBC proposal to set up 
local online video services. Here, Ofcom found that the BBC‟s proposal would have a 
significantly negative impact on commercial service providers‟ revenue streams. This 
provides an early clear example of the kind of exercises which will be increasingly 
conducted across the EU as Member States move towards NGN environments. The 
BBC‟s move to create a PVT could be seen as something of an anticipatory, defensive 
move (Humphreys 2010). However, it is clear that its component parts resonate with the 
issues which make up the much earlier enunciated elements of the EU‟s 1997 Protocol on 
Public Service Broadcasting in the Treaty of Amsterdam. Whilst the determination of the 
PSB remit remains very much at the national level, it is the case that the EU‟s ability to 
question it through various means, not least its competition policy investigative powers, 
will mean that it is likely to become a more influential actor in the way in which the 
content and service aspects of NGNs evolve. 
 
Based on the evidence to date, and in respect of the idea of developing regulated 
competition to compete for public service resources to be made available for PMS, the 
EU is likely to be sympathetic towards changes which would result in sharing PMS 
revenues more among a range of broadcasters. This idea, though controversial, shows 
some signs of gaining influence at the national level. Its most high profile introduction 
has occurred in Ireland since 2005 with the sharing of a significant proportion of licence 
fee revenue (currently around Euro 14 million) among a range of broadcasters in addition 
to the main PSB, RTE (Rafter 2010). In the UK, a recent review of PSB with a focus on 
„preparing for the digital future‟ raised the possibility of its more extensive distribution 
among organisations other than the BBC, citing evidence of public support for a possible 
move in this direction (Ofcom 2008: 92). Moves like these towards a competition for 
public revenue streams appear compatible with the EU‟s thinking on the evolution of 
PMS in NGN environments and are likely to elicit its support. The EU has a by now very 
well established view of the kind of Information Society that the move toward NGN 
would be an important manifestation of. Here, social welfare enhancement can be 
delivered through market based activities and practices. Its influence on this kind of 
agenda is thus likely to become more significant in the future should support for its 
introduction be located beyond the confines of Ireland and the UK.  
 
CONCLUSION: THE EMERGING CHARACTER AND FUTURE POTENTIAL OF 
THE EU AS AN ACTOR IN NGN POLICY  
 
Next Generation Networks is a complex and somewhat embryonic topic in the 
communications policy landscape in which the EU has only recently begun to develop a 
policy position. The task of creating NGN is enormous in resource terms, has a strong 
international character and logic, and cuts across many aspects of electronic network 
communication. For the EU, therefore, this complexity and uncertainty can serve to 
create a context within which it will grow as a key policy actor. There are also, however, 
strong limitations to the ability of the EU to determine NGN policy developments in its 
Member States. 
 
The EU is already showing clear signs of being a significant policy actor in the area of 
infrastructural development of NGN. Here its mandate is clear and well-established due, 
largely, to its policy successes in telecommunication. Through its legal remit and 
institutional activities around the liberalisation and harmonisation of markets that make 
up NGN infrastructural environments, the EU will play a key role alongside regulatory 
authorities at the national level across the EU. The EU has also recently begun to develop 
policy on NGN in respect of its legal powers covering state aid, the idea having come to 
prominence that the market alone may not be able to create NGN as quickly nor as 
extensively as European society would require. The basis of the EU‟s remit in both these 
regards is market-making and market-shaping. Given that NGN environments are likely 
to be driven predominantly by market forces and have an international dimension, the EU 
is thus well placed to become an influential policy player in NGN infrastructural 
evolution and monitoring, though is unlikely to play any significant role their resourcing. 
 
Whilst the infrastructural creation aspect of NGN is fairly well developed, thinking on the 
content and service dimensions of NGN is arguably at an earlier stage. Given the 
historically significant role of public service provision in broadcasting, a key issue 
concerns the place for such activity in content extensive, commercially dominated, NGN 
service environments. Central here is the extent to which publicly funded providers 
should be allowed to extend activities into the online world. This provides an apposite 
foretaste of NGN environments, where it is likely that most, if not all, services will be 
„online‟ and delivered convergently. Bound up in this are concerns over ensuring a level 
competitive playing field, determining that public money is providing value and, more 
broadly, a debate on whether the public service remit might be shared through 
competitive tender in a diverse media environment that is likely to characterise NGN. As 
illustrated, the EU has already shown considerable interest, and arguably considerable 
policy muscle, in these areas. The more content rules related to NGN are articulated 
through a marketised agenda, and the more internationalised in outlook this develops as, 
then the greater is the scope for the EU to expand its influence as the policy ground shifts 
in a direction in which it has more legal authority and legitimacy. The European 
Commission, in the context of its considerable powers under the state aid framework 
exercised to some degree already in cases related to public service broadcasting, has also 
begun to develop policy and take decisions in respect of public service media providers in 
the online world.  
 
Much more than in the case of NGN infrastructures, set against this move, however, is a 
strong conviction at the national level to determine individually the parameters of public 
service media in NGN contexts. In all but the case of services of a transnational 
character, the EU is likely to be happy to leave this to the Member State, not least 
because of its complexities and potential for controversy. The EU has set regulatory 
parameters for electronic commercial activity through its directive on e-commerce (see 
Christou and Simpson 2007) which may need to be modified if public service media 
remits allow for the selling of individually tailored media services to users. For the most 
part, however, the EU is likely to operate with more of a „light touch‟ in this part of the 
NGN policy environment, through the use of measures from the soft governance toolkit. 
Its entry point here lies in its mandate in cultural policy, and its established Protocol on 
Public Service Broadcasting which succinctly sums up the EU‟s market dominated 
perspective on the evolution of public service media and which may need to be modified 
as NGNs come on stream. The EU is also likely to produce light touch (non legally 
prescriptive) contributions to the debate on NGN content and services issues through 
extensions of  the Commission‟s work on media pluralism. 
 
Thus, the EU has the potential (and is likely therefore) to become a highly significant 
policy actor in NGN environments. However, a key problem it faces is presenting itself 
as an actor with a coherent, coordinated policy remit and package on NGN. Whilst its 
recently announced Digital Agenda for Europe is a useful marketing tool, it remains to be 
seen how the measures highlighted in this paper, where its remit and scope for action 
vary considerably, can be accommodated convincingly. The EU also faces the long-
running challenges of achieving policy coordination between its key institutions, the 
European Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission, each of 
which is likely to take strong and potentially divergent positions on NGN policy matters. 
In any event, policy controversies, contradictions and successes (likely to be illuminated 
by scholars of European communications policy and the media as they arise) will do 
nothing to diminish the profile of the EU as a policy actor in NGN environments, which 
is already considerable and likely to grow. 
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1
 Between December 2003 and August 2009, the European Commission has made 47 decisions in respect 
of state aid to broadband (European Commission Competition DG, 2009). Of the 22 decisions taken until 
2006, the Commission adopted a negative conclusion in only one case. 
